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A companion article in this issue, New facts in
finance, summarizes the revolution in how financial
economists view the world. Briefly, there are strategies
that result in high average returns without large betas,
that is, with no strong tendency for the strategys
returns to move up and down with the market as a
whole. Multifactor models have supplanted the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) in describing these phe-
nomena. Stock and bond returns, once thought to be
independent over time, turn out to be predictable at
long horizons. All of these phenomena seem to reflect
a premium for holding macroeconomic risks associated
with the business cycle and for holding assets that
do poorly in times of financial distress. They also all
reflect the information in priceshigh prices lead to
low returns and low prices lead to high returns.
The world of investment opportunities has also
changed. Where once an investor faced a fairly straight-
forward choice between managed mutual funds, index
funds, and relatively expensive trading on his own
account, now he must choose among a bewildering
variety of fund styles (such as value, growth, small
cap, balanced, income, global, emerging market, and
convergence), as well as more complex claims of active
fund managers with customized styles and strategies,
and electronic trading via the Internet. (Msn.coms
latest advertisement suggests that one should sign
up in order to check the hours hottest stocks. Does
a beleaguered investor really have to do that to earn
a reasonable return?) The advertisements of invest-
ment advisory services make it seem important to tailor
an investment portfolio from this bewildering set of
choices to the particular circumstances, goals, and
desires of each investor.
What should an investor do? An important cur-
rent of academic research investigates how portfolio
theory should adapt to our new view of the financial
world. In this article, I summarize this research and I
distill its advice for investors. In particular, which of
the bewildering new investment styles seem most
promising? Should you attempt to time stock, bond,
or foreign exchange markets, and if so how much?
To what extent and how should an investment portfo-
lio be tailored to your specific circumstances? Finally,
what can we say about the future investment envi-
ronment? What kind of products will be attractive to
investors in the future, and how should public policy
react to these financial innovations?
I start by reviewing the traditional academic port-
folio advice, which follows from the traditional view
that the CAPM is roughly correct and that returns are
not predictable over time. In that view, all investors
(who do not have special information) should split
their money between risk-free bonds and a broad-
based passively managed index fund that approximates
the market portfolio. More risk-tolerant investors
put more money into the stock fund, more risk averse
investors put more money into the bond fund, and
that is it.
The new academic portfolio advice reacts to the
new facts. An investor should hold, in addition to the
market portfolio and risk-free bonds, a number of pas-
sively managed style funds that capture the broad
(nondiversifiable) risks common to large numbers60 Economic Perspectives
of investors. In addition to the overall level of risk
aversion, his exposure to or aversion to the various
additional risk factors matters as well. For example,
an investor who owns a small steel company should
shade his investments away from a steel industry
portfolio, or cyclical stocks in general; a wealthy inves-
tor with no other business or labor income can afford
to take on the value and other stocks that seem to
offer a premium in return for potentially poor perfor-
mance in times of financial distress. The stock market
is a way of transferring risks; those exposed to risks
can hedge them by proper investments, and those
who are not exposed to risks can earn a premium by
taking on risks that others do not wish to shoulder.
Since returns are somewhat predictable, investors
can enhance their average returns by moving their
assets around among broad categories of investments.
However, the market timing signals are slow-moving,
and I show that the uncertainty about the nature and
strength of market timing effects dramatically reduces
the optimal amount by which investors can profit
from them.
I emphasize a cautionary fact: The average inves-
tor must hold the market. You should only vary from
a passive market index if you are different from every-
one else. It cannot be the case that every investor
should tilt his portfolio toward value or other high-
yield strategies. If everybody did it, the phenomenon
would disappear. Thus, if such strategies will persist
at all, it must be the case that for every investor who
should take advantage of them, there is another in-
vestor who should take an unusually low position,
sacrificing the good average returns for a reduction
in risk. It cannot be the case that every investor
should market time, buying when prices are low
and selling when prices are high. If everyone did it,
that phenomenon would also disappear.  The phenom-
enon can only persist if, for every investor who should
enhance returns by such market-timing, there is an-
other investor who is so exposed to or averse to the
time-varying risks that cause return predictability,
that he should buy high and sell low, again earning
a lower average return in exchange for avoiding risks.
We have only scratched the surface of asset
markets usefulness for sharing risks. As often in eco-
nomics, what appears from the outside to be greedy
behavior is in fact socially useful.
The traditional view
The new portfolio theory really extends rather
than overturns the traditional academic portfolio the-
ory. Thus, its useful to start by reminding ourselves
what the traditional portfolio theory is and why. The
traditional academic portfolio theory, starting from
Markowitz (1952) and expounded in every finance
textbook, remains one of the most useful and enduring
bits of economics developed in the last 50 years.
Two-fund theorem
The traditional advice is to split your investments
between a money-market fund and a broad-based,
passively managed stock fund. That fund should con-
centrate on minimizing fees and transaction costs,
period. It should avoid the temptation to actively
manage its portfolio, trying to chase the latest hot
stock or trying to foresee market movements. An index
fund or other approximation to the market portfolio
that passively holds a bit of every stock is ideal.
Figure 1 summarizes the analysis behind this
advice. The straight line gives the mean-variance
frontierthe portfolios that give the highest mean
return for every level of volatility. Every investor
should pick a portfolio on the mean-variance frontier.
The upward-curved lines are indifference curves that
represent investors preference for more mean return
and less volatility. The indifference curve to the lower
left represents a risk-averse investor, who chooses a
portfolio with less mean return but also less volatility;
the indifference curve to the upper right represents a
more risk-tolerant investor who chooses a portfolio
with more mean return but also higher risk.
This seems like a lot of person-specific portfolio
formation. However, every portfolio on the mean-vari-
ance frontier can be formed as a combination of a
risk-free money-market fund and the market portfolio
of all risky assets. Therefore, every investor need only
hold different proportions of these two funds.
Bad portfolio advice
The portfolio advice is not so remarkable for what
it does say, which given the setup is fairly straight-
forward, as for what it does not say. Compared with
common sense and much industry practice, it is radi-
cal advice.
One might have thought that investors willing to
take on a little more risk in exchange for the promise
of better returns should weight their portfolios to
riskier stocks, or to value, growth, small-cap, or other
riskier fund styles. Conversely, one might have thought
that investors who are willing to forego some return
for more safety should weight their portfolios to safer
stocks, or to blue-chip, income, or other safer fund
styles. Certainly, some professional advice in deciding
which style is suited for an investors risk tolerance,
if not a portfolio professionally tailored to each inves-
tors circumstances, seems only sensible and prudent.
The advertisements that promise we build the port-
folio thats right for you cater to this natural and
sensible-sounding idea.61 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Figure 1 proves that nothing of the sort is true.
All stock portfolios lie on or inside the curved risky
asset frontier. Hence, an investor who wants more
return and is willing to take more risk than the market
portfolio will do better by borrowing to invest in the
marketincluding the large-cap, income, and other-
wise safe stocksthan by holding a portfolio of risk-
ier stocks. An investor who wants something less
risky than the market portfolio will do better by split-
ting his investment between the market and a money-
market fund than by holding only safe stocks, even
though his stock portfolio will then contain some of
the small-cap, value, or otherwise risky stocks. Every-
one holds the same market portfolio; the only decision
is how much of it to hold.
The two-fund theorem in principle still allows for
a good deal of customized portfolio formation and
active management if investors or managers have
different information or beliefs. For example, if an in-
vestor knows that small-cap stocks are ready for a
rebound, then the optimal (or tangency) portfolio that
reflects this knowledge will be more heavily weighted
toward small-cap stocks than the market portfolio held
by the average investor. All the analysis of figure 1
holds, but this specially constructed tangency port-
folio goes in the place indicated by the market portfo-
lio in the figure. However, the empirical success of
market efficiency, and the poor performance of profes-
sional managers relative to passive indexation, strongly
suggests that these attempts will not pay off for most
investors. For this reason, the standard advice is to
hold passively managed funds that concentrate on
minimizing transaction costs and fees, rather than a
carefully constructed tangency portfolio that reflects
an investors or managers special insights. However,
a quantitative portfolio management industry tries
hard to mix information or beliefs about the behavior
of different securities with the theory of figure 1 (for
example, see Black and Litterman, 1991).
The two-fund theorem leaves open the possibility
that the investors horizon matters as well as his risk
aversion. What could be more natural than the often
repeated advice that a long-term investor can afford
to ride out all the markets short-term volatility, while
a short-term investor should avoid stocks because he
may have to sell at the bottom rather than wait for the
inevitable recovery after a price drop? The fallacy
lies in the inevitable recovery. If returns are close
to independent over time (like a coin flip), and prices
are close to a random walk, a price drop makes it no
more likely that prices will rise more in the future. This
view implies that stocks are not safer in the long run,
and the stock/bond allocation should be independent
of investment horizon.
This proposition can be shown to be precisely
true in several popular mathematical models of the
portfolio decision. If returns are independent over
time, then the mean and variance of continuously
compounded returns rises in proportion to the horizon:
The mean and variance of ten-year returns are ten
times those of one-year returns, so the ratio of mean
to variance is the same at all horizons. More elegantly,
Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) show that an
investor with a constant relative risk aversion utility
who can continually rebalance his portfolio between
stocks and bonds will always choose the same stock/
bond proportion regardless of investment horizon,
when returns are independent over time.
Taking the advice
This advice has had a sizable impact on portfolio
practice. Before this advice was widely popularized in
the early 1970s, the proposition that professional active
management and stock selection could outperform
blindly holding an index seemed self-
evident, and passively managed index
funds were practically unknown. They
have exploded in size since then. The
remaining actively managed funds clearly
feel the need to defend active management
in the face of the advice to hold passive
index funds and the fact that active man-
agers selected on any ex-ante basis under-
perform indexes ex-post.
The one input to the optimal portfo-
lio advice is risk tolerance, and many pro-
viders of investment services have started
thinking about how to measure risk toler-
ance using a series of questionnaires.
This is the trickiest part of the conven-
tional advice, in part since conventional
FIGURE 1
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measures of risk tolerance often seem quite out of
whack with risk aversion displayed in asset markets.
(This is the equity premium puzzle; see Cochrane,
1997, for a review.) However, the basic question is
whether one is more risk tolerant or less risk tolerant
than the average investor. This question is fairly easy
to conceptualize and can lead to a solid qualitative,
if not quantitative, answer.
One might object to the logical inconsistency of
providing portfolio advice based on a view of the
world in which everyone is already following such
advice. (This logic is what allowed me to identify the
mean-variance frontier with the market portfolio.)
However, this logic is only wrong if other investors
are systematically wrong. If some investors hold too
much of a certain stock, but others hold too little of
it, market valuations are unaffected and the advice to
hold the market portfolio is still valid.
New portfolio theory
Multiple factors: An N-fund theorem
Figure 2 shows how the simple two-fund theorem
of figure 1 changes if there are multiple sources of
priced risk. This section is a graphical version of Famas
(1996) analysis. Much of the theory comes from
Merton (1969, 1971, 1973).
To keep the figure simple I consider just one addi-
tional factor. For concreteness, think of an additional
recession factor. Now, investors care about three
attributes of their portfolios: 1) They want higher
average returns; 2) they want lower standard devia-
tions or overall risk; and 3) they are willing to accept
a portfolio with a little lower mean return or a little
higher standard deviation of return if the portfolio
does not do poorly in recessions. In the context of
figure 2, this means that investors are happier with
portfolios that are higher up (more mean), more to the
left (less standard deviation), and farther out (lower
recession sensitivity). The indifference curves of
figure 1 become indifference surfaces. Panel A of fig-
ure 2 shows one such surface curving upwards.
As with figure 1, we must next think about what
is available. We can now calculate a frontier of port-
folios based on their mean, variance, and recession
sensitivity. This frontier is the multifactor efficient
frontier. A typical investor then picks a point as shown
in panel A of figure 2, which gives him the best possible
portfoliotrading off mean, variance, and recession
sensitivitythat is available. Investors want to hold
multifactor efficient, rather than mean-variance effi-
cient, portfolios. As the mean-variance frontier of fig-
ure 1 is a hyperbola, this frontier is a revolution of a
hyperbola. The appendix summarizes the mathematics
behind this figure.
Panel B of figure 2 adds a risk-free rate. As the
mean-variance frontier of figure 1 was the minimal V
shape emanating from the risk-free rate (Rf) that includes
the hyperbolic risky frontier, now the multifactor effi-
cient frontier is the minimum cone that includes the
hyperbolic risky multifactor efficient frontier, as shown.
FIGURE 2
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Portfolio theory in a multifactor world






Notes: Panel A shows an indifference surface and optimal portfolio in the case with no risk-free rate.
The dot marks the optimal portfolio where the indifference surface touches the multifactor efficient
frontier. Panel B shows the set of multifactor efficient portfolios with a risk-free rate. The two cone-
shaped surfaces intersect on the black line with two dots. The two dots are the market portfolio and an
additional multifactor-efficient portfolio; all multifactor-efficient portfolios on the outer cone can be
reached by combinations of the risk-free rate, the market, and the extra multifactor-efficient portfolio.
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As every point of the mean-variance frontier of
figure 1 can be reached by some combination of two
fundsa risk-free rate and the market portfolionow
every point on the multifactor efficient frontier can
be reached by some combination of three multifactor
efficient funds. The most convenient set of portfolios
is the risk-free rate (money-market security), the market
portfolio (the risky portfolio held by the average inves-
tor), and one additional multifactor efficient portfolio
on the tangency region as shown in panel B of figure
2. It is convenient to take this third portfolio to be a
zero-cost, zero-beta portfolio, so that it isolates the
extra dimension of risk.
Investors now may differ in their desire or ability
to take on recession-related risk as well as in their tol-
erance for overall risk. Thus, some will want portfolios
that are farther in and out, while others will want port-
folios that are farther to the left and right. They can
achieve these varied portfolios by different weights in
the three multifactor efficient portfolios, or three funds.
Implications for mean-variance investors
The mean-variance frontier still existsit is the
projection of the cone shown in figure 2 on the mean-
variance plane. As the figure shows, the average inves-
tor is willing to give up some mean or accept more
variance in order to reduce the recession-sensitivity
of his portfolio. The average investor must hold the
market portfolio, so the market return is no longer
on the mean-variance frontier.
Suppose, however, that you are concerned only
with mean and varianceyou are not exposed to the
recession risk, or the risks associated with any other
factor, and you only want to get the best possible mean
return for given standard deviation. If so, you still
want to solve the mean-variance problem of figure 1,
and you still want a mean-variance efficient portfolio.
The important implication of a multifactor world is that
you, the mean-variance investor, should no longer
hold the market portfolio.
You can still achieve a mean-variance efficient
portfolio just as in figure 1 by a combination of a
money market fund and a single tangency portfolio,
lying on the upper portion of the curved risky-asset
frontier. The tangency portfolio now takes stronger
positions than the market portfolio in factors such as
value or recession-sensitive stocks that the average
investor fears.
Predictable returns
The fact that returns are in fact somewhat predict-
able modifies the standard portfolio advice in three
ways. It introduces horizon effects, it allows market-
timing strategies, and it introduces multiple factors
via hedging demands (if expected returns vary over
time, investors may want to hold assets that protect
them against this risk).
Horizon effects
Recall that when stock returns are independent
over time (like coin flips), the allocation between stocks
and bonds does not depend at all on the investment
horizon, since mean returns (reward) and the variance
of returns (risk) both increase in proportion to the
investment horizon. But if returns are predictable, the
mean and variance may no longer scale the same way
with horizon. If a high return today implies a high return
tomorrowpositive serial correlationthen the vari-
ance of returns will increase with horizon faster than
does the mean return. In this case, stocks are worse
in the long run. If a high return today implies a lower
return tomorrownegative serial correlation or mean
reversionthen the variance of long-horizon returns
is lower than the variance of one-period returns times
the horizon. In this case, stocks are more attractive
for the long run.1 For example, if the second coin flip
is always the opposite of the first coin flip, then two
coin flips are much less risky than they would be if
each flip were independent, and a long-run coin
flipper is more likely to take the bet.
Which case is true? Overall, the evidence sug-
gests that stock prices do tend to come back slowly
and partially after a shock, so return variances at
horizons of five years and longer are about one-half
to two-thirds as large as short-horizon variances sug-
gest. Direct measures of the serial correlation of stock
returns, or equivalent direct measures of the mean
and variance of long-horizon returns, depend a lot on
the period studied and the econometric method. Mul-
tivariate methods give somewhat stronger evidence.
Intuitively, the price/dividend (p/d) ratio does not
explode. Hence, the long-run variance of prices must
be the same as the long-run variance of dividends,
and this extra piece of information helps to measure the
long-run variance of returns. (Cochrane and Sbordone,
1986, and Cochrane, 1994, use this idea. See Campbell,
Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997, for a summary of these issues
and of the extensive literature.)
How big are the horizon effects? Barberis (1999)
calculates optimal portfolios for different horizons
when returns are predictable. Figure 3 presents some
of his results.
We start with a very simple setup: The investor
allocates his portfolio between stocks and bonds and
then holds it without rebalancing for the indicated
horizon. His objective is to maximize the expected util-
ity of wealth at the indicated horizon. The flat line in
figure 3 shows the standard result: If returns are not64 Economic Perspectives
predictable, then the allocation to stocks does not
depend on horizon.
The top (black) line in figure 3 adds the effects of
return predictability on the investment calculation. The
optimal allocation to stocks increases sharply with
horizon, from about 40 percent for a monthly horizon
to 100 percent for a ten-year horizon. To quantify the



















using the d/p ratio for the forecasting variable x.
(Whether or not one includes returns in the right
hand side makes little difference.) Barberis estimates
significant mean-reversion: In Barberiss regressions,
the implied standard deviation of ten-year returns is
23.7 percent, just more than half of the 45.2 percent
value implied by the standard deviation of monthly
returns. Stocks are indeed safer in the long run, and
the greater allocation to stocks shown in figure 3 for
a long-run investor reflects this fact.
Uncertainty about predictability
This calculation ignores the fact that we do not
know how predictable returns really are. One could
address this fact by calculating standard errors for
portfolio computations; and such standard errors do
indicate substantial uncertainty. However, standard
error uncertainty is symmetricreturns might be more
predictable than we think or they might be less predict-
able. This measure of uncertainty would say that we
are just as likely to want an even greater long-run
stock allocation as we are to shade the advice back
to a constant allocation.
Intuitively, however, uncertainty about predict-
ability should lead us to shade the advice back toward
the standard advice. Standard errors do not capture
the uncertainties behind this (good) intuition for at
least two reasons.
First, the predictability captured in Barberiss
regression of returns on dividend/price ratios certainly
results to some extent from data-dredging. Thousands
of series were examined by many authors, and we have
settled on the one or two that seem to predict returns
best in sample. The predictability will obviously be
worse out of sample, and good portfolio advice should
account for this bias. Standard errors take the set of
forecasting variables and the functional form as given.
Second, the portfolio calculation assumes that
the investor knows the return forecasting process
perfectly. Standard errors only reflect the fact that we
do not know the return forecasting process, so we
are unsure about what investors want to do.2 What
we would like to do is to solve a portfolio problem in
which investors treat uncertainty about the forecasta-
bility of returns as part of the risk that they face, along
with the risks represented by the error terms of the
statistical model. Kandel and Stambaugh (1996) and
Barberis (1999) tackle this important problem.
Figure 3 also gives Barberiss calculations of the
effects of parameter uncertainty on the stock/bond
allocation problem. (See box 1 for a description of  how
these calculations are made.) The lowest (dotted) line
considers a simple case. The investor knows, correctly,
that returns are independent over time (not predict-
able) but he is not sure about the mean return. With-
out parameter uncertainty, this situation gives rise to
the constant stock allocationthe flat line. Adding
parameter uncertainty lowers the allocation to stocks
for long horizons; it declines from 34 percent to about
28 percent at a ten-year horizon.
The reason is simple. If the investor sees a few
good years of returns after making the investment,
this raises his estimate of the actual mean return and,
thus, his estimate of the returns over the rest of the
investment period. Conversely, a few bad years will
lower his estimate of the mean return for remaining
years. Thus, learning about parameters induces a
FIGURE 3
Allocation to stocks, different
investment horizons
percent allocation to stocks
Notes: The investor maximizes the utility of terminal wealth via
a buy-and-hold investment in stocks versus bonds. The investor
has constant relative risk aversion utility with a risk aversion
coefficient of 10. The top calculation (black) includes predictable
returns modeled by a regression on d/p ratios (equation 1). The
second calculation (color) includes predictable returns and the
effects of parameter uncertainty. The third calculation (black dash)
assumes  unpredictable returns, and no parameter uncertainty. The
bottom calculation (color dash) assumes unpredictable returns, but
adds parameter uncertainty. All distributions are conditional on a
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positive correlation between early returns and later
returns. Positive correlation makes long-horizon returns
more than proportionally risky and reduces the opti-
mal allocation to stocks.
The colored line in figure 3 shows the effects of
parameter uncertainty on the investment problem,
when we allow return predictability as well. As the
figure shows, uncertainty about predictable returns
cuts the increase in stock allocation from one to ten
years in half. In addition to the positive correlation of
returns due to learning about their mean mentioned
above, uncertainty about the true amount of predict-
ability adds to the risk (including parameter risk) of
longer horizon returns.
Market timing
Market-timing strategies are the most obvious
implication of return predictability. If there are times
when expected returns are high and other times when
they are low, you might well want to hold more stocks
when expected returns are high, and fewer when expect-
ed returns are low. Of course, the crucial question is,
how much market-timing should you engage in? Sev-
eral authors have recently addressed this technically
challenging question.
Much of the difficulty with return predictability
(as with other dynamic portfolio questions) lies in com-
puting the optimal strategyexactly how should you
adjust your portfolio as the return prediction signals
change? Gallant, Hansen, and Tauchen (1990) show
how to measure the potential benefits of market-timing
without actually calculating the market-timing strategy.
The meanstandard deviation tradeoff or Sharpe
ratiothe slope of the frontier graphed in figure 1
is a convenient summary of any strategy. If the risk-
free rate is constant and known, the square of the
maximum unconditional Sharpe ratio is the average
of the squared conditional Sharpe ratios. (The appen-
dix details the calculation.) Since we take an average
of squared conditional Sharpe ratios, volatility in
conditional Sharpe ratiostime-variation in expected
returns or return volatilityis good for an investor
who cares about the unconditional Sharpe ratio. By
moving into stocks in times of high Sharpe ratio and
moving out of the market in times of low Sharpe ratio,
the investor does better than he would by buying
and holding. Furthermore, the best unconditional
Sharpe ratio is directly related to the R2 in the re-
turn-forecasting regression.
The buy-and-hold Sharpe ratio has been about
0.5 on an annual basis in U.S. datastocks have
earned an average return of about 8 percent over
Treasury bills, with a standard deviation of about 16
percent. Table 1 presents a calculation of the increased
Sharpe ratio one should be able to achieve by market-
timing, based on regressions of returns on dividend/
price ratios. (I use the regression estimates from table
1 of  New facts in finance.)
As table 1 indicates, market-timing should be a
great benefit. Holding constant the portfolio volatility,
market-timing should raise average returns by about
two-fifths at an annual horizon and it should almost
double average returns at a five-year horizon.
BOX 1
How to include model uncertainty in portfolio problems
A statistical model, such as equations 1 and 2,
tells us the distribution of future returns once we
know the parameters q,  fx x x tt (R +11 2 q, , ,..., ), where
xt denotes all the data used (returns, d/p, etc.).
We would like to evaluate uncertainty by the
distribution of returns conditional only on the his-
tory available to make guesses about the future,
fR x x x tt (, . . . ) . +1 1 2  We can use Bayesian analysis
to evaluate this concept. If we can summarize the
information about parameters given the historical
data as  fx xx t ( , .... ), q
1 2  then we can find the dis-
tribution we want by
fR xx x fR f xx xd tt t t ( , ... ) ( ) ( , ... ) . ++ =I 1 1 21 1 2 qq q
In turn, we can construct  fx xx t ( , .... ), q
1 2
from a prior  f () q and the likelihood function
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Barberis (1999), Kandel and Stambaugh
(1996), Brennan, Schwartz, and Lagnado (1997)
use these rules to compute  fR xx x tt ( , ... ), +1 1 2
and solve portfolio problems with this distribu-
tion over future returns.66 Economic Perspectives
Optimal market-timing:
An Euler equation approach
Brandt (1999) presents a clever way to estimate a
market-timing portfolio rule without solving a model.
Where standard asset pricing models fix the consump-
tion or wealth process and estimate preference param-
eters, Brandt fixes the preference parameters (as one
does in a portfolio question) and estimates the port-
folio decision, that is, he estimates the optimal con-
sumption or wealth process.3 This calculation is very
clever because it does not require one to specify a
statistical model for the stock returns (like equations
12), and it does not require one to solve
the economic model.
Figure 4 presents one of Brandts re-
sults. The figure shows the optimal alloca-
tion to stocks as a function of investment
horizon and of the dividend/price ratio,
which forecasts returns. There is a mild
horizon effect, about in line with Barberiss
results of figure 3 without parameter uncer-
tainty: Longer term investors hold more
stocks. There is also a strong market-timing
effect. The fraction of wealth invested in
stocks varies by about 200 percentage
points for all investors. For example, long-
term investors vary from about 75 percent
to 225 percent of wealth invested in stocks
as the d/p ratio rises from 2.8 percent to
5.5 percent.
Optimal market-timing: A solution
Campbell and Vicera (1999) actually
calculate a solution to the optimal market-
timing question. They model investors
who desire lifetime consumption4 rather than portfolio
returns at a fixed horizon. They model the time-varia-
tion in expected stock returns via equation 1 on d/p
ratios. Their investors live only off invested wealth
and have no labor income or labor income risk. Thus,
these investors are poised to take advantage of busi-
ness cycle related variation in expected returns.
As one might expect, the optimal investment strat-
egy takes strong advantage of market-timing possibili-
ties. Figure 5 reproduces Campbell and Viceras optimal
allocation to stocks as a function of the expected
return, forecast from d/p ratios via equation 1. A risk
aversion coefficient of 4 implies that investors rough-
ly want to be fully invested in stocks at the average
expected excess return of 6 percent, so this is a sensi-
ble risk aversion value to consider. Then, as the d/p
ratio ranges from minus two to plus one standard
deviations from its mean, these investors range from
50 percent in stocks to 220 percent in stocks. This
is aggressive market-timing indeed.
Figure 6 presents the calculation in a different
way: It gives the optimal allocation to stocks over
time, based on dividend/price ratio variation over
time. The high d/p ratios of the 1950s suggest a
strong stock position, and that strong position profits
from the high returns of the late 1950s to early 1960s.
The low d/p ratios of the 1960s suggest a much smaller
position in stocks, and this smaller position avoids
the bad returns of the 1970s. The high d/p ratios of
the 1970s suggest strong stock positions again, which
benefit from the good return of the 1980s; current
TABLE 1
Maximum unconditional Sharpe ratios
Annualized
Horizon k (years) R2 Sharpe ratio





Notes: Maximum unconditional Sharpe ratios available
from market-timing based on regressions of value-weighted
NYSE index returns on the dividend/price ratio. The table
reports annualized Sharpe ratios corresponding to each R2.











 and is derived in
the appendix.
FIGURE 4















































Notes: Optimal allocation to stocks as a function of horizon and dividend yield.
Source: Brandt (1999).67 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
unprecedented high prices suggest the lowest stock
positions ever. The optimal allocation to stocks again
varies wildly, from 0 (now) to over 300 percent.
Campbell and Viceras calculations are, if anything,
conservative compared with others in this literature.
Other calculations, using other utility functions, so-
lution techniques, and calibrations of the forecasting
process often produce even more aggressive market-
timing strategies. For example, Brennan, Schwartz, and
Lagnado (1997) make a similar calculation with two
additional forecasting variables. They report market-
timing strategies that essentially jump back and forth
between constraints at 0 percent in stocks and 100
percent in stocks.
Campbell and Vicera also present achieved utility
calculations that mirror the lesson of table 1: Failing
to time the market seems to impose a large cost.
Doubts
One may be understandably reluctant to take on
quite such strong market-timing positions as indicated
by figures 5 and 6, or to believe table 1 that market
timing can nearly double five-year Sharpe ratios. In
particular, one might question advice that would have
meant missing the dramatic runup in stock values of
the late 1990s. Rather than a failure of nerve, perhaps
such reluctance reveals that the calculations do not
yet include important considerations and, therefore,
overstate the desirable amount of market-timing and
its benefits.
First, the unconditional Sharpe ratio as reported
in table 1 for, say, five-year horizons answers the ques-
tion, Over very long periods, if an investor follows
the best possible market-timing strategy and evaluates
his portfolio based on five-year returns, what Sharpe
ratio does he achieve? It does not answer the ques-
tion, Given todays d/p, what is the best Sharpe ra-
tio you can achieve for the next five years by
following market-timing signals? The latter question
characterizes the return distribution conditional on to-
days d/p. It is harder to evaluate; it depends on the
initial d/p level, and it is lower, especially for a slow-
moving signal such as d/p.
To see the point, suppose that the d/p ratio is
determined on day one, is constant thereafter, and in-
dicates high or low returns in perpetuity. Conditional
on the d/p ratio, one cannot time the market at all. But
since the investor will invest less in stocks in the low-
return state and more in the high-return state, he will
unconditionally time the market (that is, adjust his
portfolio based on day one information)
and this gives him a better date-zero (un-
conditional) Sharpe ratio than he would
obtain by fixing his allocation at date zero.
This fact captures the intuition that there
is a lot more money to be made from a 50
percent R2 at a daily horizon than at a five-
year horizon, where the calculations in
table 1 are not affected by the persistence
of the market-timing signal. Campbell and
Viceras (1999) utility calculations are also
based on the unconditional distribution,
so the optimal degree and benefit of mar-
ket-timing might be less, conditional on
the observed d/p ratio at the first date.
Second, there are good statistical
reasons to think that the regressions
overstate the predictability of returns.
FIGURE 5
Optimal allocation to stocks
allocation to stocks, percent
Notes: Optimal allocation to stocks as a function of the expected
return implied by a regression that forecasts stock returns from
dividend/price ratios. The line extends from a d/p ratio two
standard deviations above its mean (low expected returns) to
one standard deviation below its mean (high expected returns).
Risk aversion is 4.0.
Source: Campbell and Vicera (1999).
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Notes: Risk aversion g = 4.00 (black line) and g = 20.00 (colored dashed line).
Source: Campbell and Vicera (1999).
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1) Figure 6 emphasizes one reason: The d/p ratio signal
has only crossed its mean four times in the 50 years
of postwar history. You have to be very patient to
profit from this trading rule. Also, we really have only
four postwar data points on the phenomenon. 2) The
dividend/price ratio was selected, in sample, among
hundreds of potential forecasting variables. It has
not worked well out of samplethe last two years of
high market returns with low d/p ratios have cut the
estimated predictability in half! 3) The model imposes
a linear specification, where the actual predictability
is undoubtedly better modeled by some unknown
nonlinear function. In particular, the linear specifica-
tion implies negative expected stock returns at many
points in the sample, and one might not want to take
this specification seriously for portfolio construction.
4) The d/p ratio is strongly autocorrelated, and esti-
mates of this autocorrelation are subject to econometric
problems. For this reason, long-horizon return proper-
ties inferred from a regression such as equations 1 and
2 are often more dramatic and apparently more precise-
ly measured than direct long-horizon estimates.
The natural next step is to include this parameter
uncertainty in the portfolio problem, as I did above
for the case of independent returns. While this has
not been done yet in a model with Campbell and Vice-
ras (1999) level of realism (and for good reasons
Campbell and Viceras non-Bayesian solution is
already a technical tour de force), Barberis (1999)
makes such calculations in his simpler formulation. He
uses a utility of terminal wealth and no intermediate
trading, and he forces the allocation to stocks to be
less than 100 percent.
Figure 7 presents Barberiss (1999) results.5 As
the figure shows, uncertainty about the parameters of
the regression of returns on d/p almost eliminates the
usefulness of market-timing.
Third, it is uncomfortable to note that fund returns
still cluster around the (buy-and-hold) market Sharpe
ratio (see figure 7 of New facts in finance). Here is
a mechanical strategy that supposedly earns average
returns twice those of the market with no increase in
risk. If the strategy is real and implementable, one
must argue that funds simply failed to follow it.
Market-timing, like value, does requires patience
and the willingness to stick with a portfolio that departs
from the indexing crowd. For example, a market-timer
following Campbell and Viceras rules in figures 5 and
6 would have missed most of the great runup in stocks
of the last few years. Fund managers who did that are
now unemployed. On the other hand, if an eventual
crash comes, the market timer will look wise.
Finally, ones reluctance to take such strong
market-timing advice reflects the inescapable fact
that getting more return requires taking on more, or
different, kinds of risk. A market-timer must buy at
the bottom, when everyone else is in a panic; he
must sell at the top (now) when everyone else is feel-
ing flush. His portfolio will have a greater mean for a
given level of variance over very long horizons, but
it will do well and badly at very different times from
everyone elses portfolio. He will often underperform
a benchmark.
Hedging demands
Market-timing addresses whether you should
change your allocation to stocks over time as a return
signal rises or falls. Hedging demands address whether
your overall allocation to stocks, or to specific
portfolios, should be higher or lower as a result of
FIGURE 7
allocation to stocks, percent
Allocation to stocks as a function of dividend/price ratio, with parameter uncertainty
A. Risk aversion coefficient 10
allocation to stocks, percent










Notes: The colored line ignores parameter uncertainty, as in Campbell and Vicera (1999).
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return predictability, in order to protect you against
reinvestment risk.
A long-term bond is the simplest example. Suppose
you want to minimize the risk of your portfolio ten
years out. If you invest in apparently safe short-term
risk-free assets like Treasury bills or a money-market
fund, your ten-year return is in fact quite risky, since
interest rates can fluctuate. You should hold a ten-
year (real, discount) bond. Its price will fluctuate a lot
as interest rates go up and down, but its value in ten
years never changes.
Another way of looking at this situation is that,
if interest rates decline, the price of the ten-year bond
will skyrocket; it will skyrocket just enough so that,
reinvested at the new lower rates, it provides the same
ten-year return as it would have if interest rates had
not changed. Changes in the ten-year bond value
hedge the reinvestment risk of short-term bonds. If
lots of investors want to secure the ten-year value
of their portfolios, this will raise demand for ten-year
bonds and lower their prices.
In general, the size and sign of a hedging demand
depend on risk aversion and horizon and, thus, will
be different for different investors. If the investor is
quite risk averseinfinitely so in my bond example
he wants to buy assets whose prices go up when ex-
pected returns decline. But an investor who is not so
risk averse might want to buy assets whose prices
go up when expected returns rise. If the investor is
sitting around waiting for a good time to invest, and
is willing to pounce on good (high expected return)
investments, he would prefer to have a lot of money
to invest when the good opportunity comes around.
It turns out that the dividing line in the standard
(CRRA) model is logarithmic utility or a risk aversion
coefficient of 1investors more risk averse than this
want assets whose prices go up when expected re-
turns decline, and vice versa. Most investors are un-
doubtedly more risk averse than this, but not
necessarily all investors. Horizon matters as well. A
short horizon investor cares nothing about reinvest-
ment risk and, therefore, has zero hedging demand.
In addition, the relationship between price and
expected returns is not so simple for stocks as for
bonds and must be estimated statistically. The pre-
dictability evidence reviewed above suggests that
high stock returns presage lower subsequent returns.
High returns drive up price/dividend, price/earnings,
and market/book ratios, all of which have been strong
signals of lower subsequent returns. Therefore, stocks
are a good hedge against their own reinvestment
riskthey act like the long-term assets that they are.
This consideration raises the attractiveness of stocks
for typical (risk aversion greater than 1) investors.
Precisely, if the two-fund analysis of figure 1 suggests
a certain split between stocks and short-term bonds
for a given level of risk aversion and investment hori-
zon, then return predictability, a long horizon, and
typical risk aversion greater than 1 will result in a
higher fraction devoted to stocks. Again, exactly how
much more one should put into stocks in view of this
consideration is a tough question.
(In this case, the hedging demand reduces to
much the same logic as the horizon effects described
above. The market portfolio is a good hedge against
its own reinvestment risk, and so its long horizon
variance is less than its short horizon variance would
suggest. More generally, hedging demands can tilt a
portfolio toward stocks whose returns better predict
and, hence, better hedge the expected return on the
market index, but this long-studied possibility from
Merton [1971a, 1971b] has not yet been implemented
in practice.)
Campbell and Viceras (1999) calculations address
this hedging demand as well as market-timing demand,
and figure 5 also illustrates the strength of the hedg-
ing demand for stocks. Campbell and Viceras inves-
tors want to hold almost 30 percent of their wealth in
stocks even if the expected return of stocks is no
greater than that of bonds. Absent the hedging motive,
of course, the optimal allocation to stocks would be
zero with no expected return premium. Almost a 2 per-
cent negative stock return premium is necessary to
dissuade Campbell and Viceras investors from holding
stocks. At the average (roughly 6 percent) expected re-
turn, of the roughly 130 percent of wealth that the risk
aversion 4 investors want to allocate to stocks, nearly
half is due to hedging demand. Thus, hedging demands
can importantly change the allocation to stocks.
However, hedging demand works in opposition
to the usual effects of risk aversion. Usually, less risk
averse people want to hold more stocks. However,
less risk averse people have lower or even negative
hedging demands, as explained above. It is possible
that hedging demand exactly offsets risk aversion;
everybody holds the same mean allocation to stocks.
This turns out not to be the case for Campbell and
Viceras numerical calibration; less risk averse people
still allocate more to stocks on average, but the effect
depends on the precise specification.
Choosing a risk-free rate
Figure 1 describes a portfolio composed of the
market portfolio and the risk-free rate. But the risk-
free rate is not as simple as it once was either. For a
consumer or an institution6 with a one-year horizon,70 Economic Perspectives
one-year bonds are risk-free, while for one with a ten-
year horizon, a ten year zero-coupon bond is risk-free.
For a typical consumer, whose objective is lifetime con-
sumption, an interest-only strip (or real level annuity) is
in fact the risk-free rate, since it provides a riskless
coupon that can be consumed at each date. Campbell
and Vicera (1998) emphasize this point. Thus, the
appropriate bond portfolio to mix with risky stocks in
the logic of figure 1 is no longer so simple as a short-
term money market fund.
Of course, these comments refer to real or in-
dexed bonds, which are only starting to become easily
available. When only nominal bonds are available,
the closest approximation to a risk-free investment
depends additionally on how much interest rate vari-
ability is due to real rates versus nominal rates. In the
extreme case, if real interest rates are constant and
nominal interest rates vary with inflation, then rolling
over short-term nominal bonds carries less long-term
real risk than holding long-term nominal bonds. In the
past, inflation was much more variable than real interest
rates in the U.S., so the fact that portfolio advice paid
little attention to the appropriate risk-free rate may
have made sense. We seem to be entering a period
in which inflation is quite stable, so real interest rate
fluctuations may dominate interest rate movements.
In this case, longer term nominal bonds become more
risk-free for long-term investors, and inflation-indexed
bonds open up the issue in any case. Once again,
new facts are opening up new challenges and oppor-
tunities for portfolio formation.
Notes of caution
The new portfolio theory can justify all sorts of
interesting new investment approaches. However,
there are several important qualifications that should
temper ones enthusiasm and that shade portfolio ad-
vice back to the traditional view captured in figure 1.
The average investor holds the market
The portfolio theory that I have surveyed so far
asks, given multiple factors or time-varying investment
opportunities, How should an investor who does not
care about these extra risks profit from them? This
may result from intellectual habit, as the past great
successes of portfolio theory addressed such inves-
tors, or it may come from experience in the money
management industry, where distressingly few investors
ask about additional sources of risk that multifactor
models and predictable returns suggest should be
a major concern.
Bear in mind, however, that the average investor
must hold the market portfolio. Thus, multiple factors
and return predictability cannot have any portfolio
implications for the average investor. In addition, for
every investor who should follow a value strategy or
time the market for the extra returns offered by those
extra risks, there must be an investor who should fol-
low the exact opposite advice. He should follow a
growth strategy or sell stocks at the bottom and buy
at the top, because he is unusually exposed to or
averse to the risks of the value or market-timing strat-
egies in his business or job. He knows that he pays a
premium for not holding those risks, but he rationally
chooses this course just as we all choose to pay a
premium for home insurance.
Again, dividend/price, price/earnings, and book/
market ratios forecast returns, if they do, because the
average investor is unwilling to follow the value and
market-timing strategies. If everyone tries to time the
market or buy more value stocks, the premiums from
these strategies will disappear and the CAPM, random
walk view of the market will reemerge. Market-timing
can only work if it involves buying stocks when
nobody else wants them and selling them when every-
body else wants them. Value and small-cap anomalies
can only work if the average investor is leery about
buying financially distressed and illiquid stocks. Port-
folio advice to follow these strategies must fall on
deaf ears for the average investor, and a large class
of investors must want to head in exactly the other
direction. If not, the premiums from these strategies
will not persist.
One can see a social function in all this: The stock
market acts as a big insurance market. By changing
weights in, say, recession-sensitive stocks, people
whose incomes are particularly hurt by recessions
can purchase insurance against that loss from people
whose incomes are not hurt by recessions. They pay
a premium to do so, which is why investors are willing
to take on the recession-related risk.
The quantitative portfolio advice is all aimed at
the providers of insurance, which may make sense if
the providers are large wealthy investors or institutions.
But for each provider of insurance, there must be a
purchaser, and his portfolio must take on the oppo-
site characteristics.
Are the effects real or behavioral, and will they last?
So far, I have emphasized the view that the average
returns from multifactor or market-timing strategies are
earned as compensation for holding real, aggregate
risks that the average investor is anxious not to hold.
This view is still debated. Roughly half of the academ-
ic studies that document such strategies interpret
them this way, while the other half interpret them as
evidence that investors are systematically irrational.
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should eliminate the assumption of rational consumers
and investors that has been at the core of all economics
since Adam Smith, in order to explain these asset
pricing anomalies.
For example, I have followed Fama and Frenchs
(1993, 1996) interpretation that the value effect exposes
the investor to systematic risks associated with econ-
omywide financial distress. However, Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) interpret the same facts as
evidence for irrationality: Investors flock to popular
stocks and away from unpopular stocks. The prices
of the unpopular stocks are depressed, and their aver-
age returns are higher as the fad slowly fades. Fama
and French point out that the behavioral view cannot
easily account for the comovement of value stocks;
the behavioral camp points out that the fundamental
risk factor is still not determined.
Similarly, the predictability of stock returns over
time is interpreted as waves of irrational exuberance
and pessimism as often as it is interpreted as time-
varying, business cycle related risk or risk aversion.
Those who advocate an economic interpretation
point to the association with business cycles (Fama
and French, 1989) and to some success for explicit
models of this association (Campbell and Cochrane,
1999); those who favor the irrational investors view
point out that the rational models are as yet imperfect.
While this academic debate is entertaining, how
does it affect a practical investor who is making a
portfolio decision? At a basic level, it does not. If you
are not exposed to the risk a certain investment repre-
sents, it does not matter why other investors shy away
from holding it.
Analogously, to decide what to buy at the grocery
store, you only have to know how you feel about
various foods and what their prices are. You do not
have to understand the economic determinants of
food prices: You do not need to know whether a sale on
tomatoes represents a real factor like good weather in
tomato growing areas, or whether it represents an
irrational fear or fad.
Will they last?
Investments do not come with average returns
as clearly marked as grocery prices, however. Investors
have to figure out whether an investment opportuni-
ty that did well in the past will continue to do well.
This is one reason that it is important to understand
whether average returns come from real or irrational
aversion to risk.
If it is real, it is most likely to persist. If a high
average return comes from exposure to risk, well un-
derstood and widely shared, that means all investors
understand the opportunity but shrink from it. Even if
the opportunity is widely publicized, investors will
not change their portfolio decisions, and the relatively
high average return will remain.
On the other hand, if it is truly irrational, or a
market inefficiency, it is least likely to persist. If a high
average return strategy involves no extra exposure to
real risks and is easy to implement (it does not incur
large transaction costs), that means that the average
investor will immediately want to invest when he hears
of the opportunity. News travels quickly, investors
react quickly, and such opportunities vanish quickly.
Recent work in behavioral finance tries to docu-
ment a way that irrational phenomena can persist
in the face of the above logic. If an asset-pricing
anomaly corresponds to a fundamental, documented,
deeply formed aspect of human psychology, then the
average investor may not pounce on the strategy the
minute he hears of it, and the phenomenon may last
(DeBondt and Thaler, 1985, and Daniel, Hirshleifer,
and Subrahmanyam, 1998). For example, many people
systematically overestimate the probability that air-
planes crash, and make wrong decisions resulting
from this belief, such as choosing to drive instead.
No amount of statistics changes this view. Most such
people readily admit that a fear of flying is irrational
but persist in it anyway. If an asset-pricing anomaly
results from such a deep-seated misperception of
risk, then it could in fact persist.
A final possibility is that the average return pre-
miums are the result of narrowly held risks. This view
is (so far) the least stressed in academic analysis. In
my opinion, it may end up being the most important.
It leads to a view that the premiums will be moderate-
ly persistent. Catastrophe-insurance enhanced bonds
provide a good example of this effect. These bonds
pay well in normal times, but either part of the principal
or interest is pledged against a tranche of a property
reinsurance contract. Thus, the bonds promise an
average return of 10 percent to 20 percent (depending
on ones view of the chance of hurricanes). However,
the risk of hurricane damage is uncorrelated with any-
thing else, and hence it is perfectly diversifiable.
Therefore, catastrophe bonds are an attractive oppor-
tunity. Before the introduction of catastrophe bonds,
there was no easy way for the average investor or
fund to participate in property reinsurance. As more
and more investors and funds hold these securities,
the prices will rise and average returns will fall. Once
the risks are widely shared, every investor (at least
those not located in hurricane-prone areas) will hold
a little bit of the risk and the high average returns will
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The essential ingredients for this story are that
the risk is narrowly shared; the high average returns
only disappear when the risk is widely shared (it can-
not be arbitraged away by a few savvy investors);
and an institutional change (the introduction, pack-
aging, and marketing of catastrophe-linked bonds)
is required before it all can happen.
This story gives a plausible interpretation of many
of the anomalies I document above. Small-cap stocks
were found in about 1979 to provide higher returns
than was justified by their market (b) risk. Yet at that
time, most funds did not invest in such stocks, and in-
dividual investors would have had a hard time form-
ing a portfolio of small-cap stocks without losing all
the benefits in the very illiquid markets for these
stocks. The risks were narrowly held. After the popu-
larization of the small-cap effect, many small-cap funds
were started, and it is now easy for investors to hold
such stocks. As the risk has been more widely shared,
the average returns seem to have fallen.
The value effect may be amenable to a similar in-
terpretation. Before about 1990, as I noted earlier, few
funds actually followed the high-return strategy of
buying really distressed stocks or shorting the popu-
lar growth stocks. It would be a difficult strategy for
an individual investor to follow, requiring courage and
frequent trading of small illiquid stocks. Now that the
effect is clear, value funds have emerged that really
do follow the strategy, and the average investor can
easily include such an offering in his portfolio. The
risk is becoming widely shared, and its average return
seems to be falling.
Even average returns on the stock market as a
whole (the equity premium) may follow the same story,
since participation has increased a great deal through
the invention of index funds, low-commission broker-
ages, and tax-sheltered retirement plans.
This story does not mean that the average returns
corresponding to such risks will vanish. They will
decline, however, until the markets have established
an equilibrium, in which every investor has bought as
much of the risk as he likes. In this story, one would
expect a large return as investors discover each strat-
egy and bid prices up to their equilibrium levels. This
may account for some of the success of small and
value stocks observed in the literature, as well as
some of the stunning success of the overall market
in recent years.
Inconsistent advice
Unfortunately, the arguments that a factor will
persist are all inconsistent with aggressive portfolio
advice. If the premium is real, an equilibrium reward
for holding risk, then the average investor knows
about it but does not invest because the extra risk ex-
actly counteracts the extra average return. If more
than a minuscule fraction of investors are not already
at their best allocations, then the market has not
reached equilibrium and the premiums will change.
If the risk is irrational, then by the time you and
I know about it, its gone. An expected return corre-
sponding to an irrational risk premium has the stron-
gest portfolio implicationseveryone should do
itbut the shortest lifetime. Thus, this view is also
inconsistent with the widespread usefulness of port-
folio advice.
If the average return comes from a behavioral
aversion to risk, it is just as inconsistent with wide-
spread portfolio advice as if were real. We can not all
be less behavioral than average, just as we can not
all be less exposed to a risk than average. The whole
argument for behavioral persistence is that the average
investor would not change his portfolio, just as the
average traveler would not quickly adjust his traveling
behavior to fear the cab ride out to the airport more
than the flight. Thus, the advice must be useless to
the vast majority of investors. If most people, on see-
ing the strategy, can be persuaded to act differently
and buy, then it is an irrational risk and will disappear.
If it is real or behavioral and will persist, then this
necessarily means that very few people will follow
the portfolio advice.
If the average return comes from a narrowly held
risk, one has to ask what institutional barriers keep
investors from sharing this risk more widely. Simple
portfolio advice may help a bitmost investors still
do not appreciate the risk/return advantages of stocks
overall, small-caps, value stocks, market-timing, and
aggressive liquidity trades. But by and large, a risk
like this needs packaging, securitizing, and marketing
more than advice. Then there will be a period of high
average returns to the early investors, followed by
lower returns, but still commoditization of the prod-
uct with fees for the intermediaries.
Economic logic
The issue of why the risk gives an average return
premium is also important to decide whether the oppor-
tunity is really there. It is not that easy to establish the
average returns of stocks and dynamic portfolio
strategies. There are many statistical anomalies that
vanish quickly out of sample. Figuring out why a
strategy carries a high average return is one of the
best ways to ensure that the high average return is
really there in the first place. Anything that is going
to work has a real economic function. A story such73 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
as I dont care much about recessions; the average
investor does; hence it makes good sense for me to
buy extra amounts of recession sensitive stocks since
I am selling insurance to the others at a premium
makes a strategy much more plausible than the output
of some statistical black box.
Conclusion
Practical application of portfolio theory
How does an investor who is trying patiently to
sort through the bewildering variety of investment
opportunities use all the new portfolio theory? Its
best to follow a step by step procedure, starting with
a little introspection.
1. What is your overall risk tolerance? As before,
you must first figure out to what extent you are will-
ing to trade off volatility for extra average returns, to
determine an appropriate overall allocation to risky
versus risk-free assets. While this question is hard to
answer in the abstract, you only need to know whether
you are more or less risk tolerant than the average in-
vestor. (Honestly, noweveryone wants to say they
are a risk taker.) The overall market is about 60 percent
stocks and 40 percent bonds, so average levels of risk
aversion, whatever they are, wind up at this value.
2. What is your horizon? This question is first
of all important for figuring out what is the relevant
risk-free asset. Longer term investors can hold longer
term bonds despite their poor one-year performance,
especially in a low-inflation environment. Second, we
have seen that stocks are somewhat safer for long-
run investors.
3. What are your risks? Would you be willing to
trade some average return in order to make sure that
your portfolio does well in particular circumstances?
For example, an investor who owns a small company
would not want his investment portfolio to do poorly
at the same time that his industry suffers a downturn,
that there is a recession, or a credit crunch, or that the
industries he sells to suffer a downturn. Thus, it makes
good sense for him to avoid stocks in the same industry
or downstream industries, or stocks that are particu-
larly sensitive to recessions or credit crunches, or
even to short them if possible. This strategy would
make sense even if these stocks give high average
returns, like the value portfolios. Similarly, he should
avoid high yield bonds that will all do badly in a credit
crunch. If the company will do poorly in response to
increases in interest rates, oil prices or similar events,
and if the company does not hedge these risks, then
the investor should take positions in interest rate sen-
sitive or oil-price sensitive securities to offset those
risks as well. Were just extending the principles behind
fire and casualty insurance to investment portfolios.
This logic extends beyond the kind of factors
(size, book to market, and so on) that have attracted
academic attention. It applies to any identifiable move-
ment in asset portfolios. For example, industry portfo-
lios are not badly explained by the CAPM, as they all
seem to have about the same average return. There-
fore, they do not show up in multifactor models. How-
ever, shorting your industry portfolio protects you
against the risks of your occupation. In fact, factors
that do not carry unusual risk premiums are even bet-
ter opportunities than the priced factors that attract
attention, since you buy insurance at zero premium.
This was always true, even in the CAPM, unpredict-
able return view. I think that the experience with mul-
tifactor models just increases our awareness of how
important this issue is.
4. What are not your risks? Next, figure out what
risks you do not face, but that give rise to an average
return premium in the market because most other inves-
tors do face these risks. For example, an investor who
has no other source of income beyond his investment
portfolio does not particularly care about recessions.
Therefore, he should buy extra amounts of recession-
sensitive stocks, value stocks, high yield bonds, etc.,
if these strategies carry a credible high average return.
This action works just like selling insurance, in return
for a premium. This is the type of investor for whom
all the portfolio advice is well worked out.
In my opinion, too many investors think they are
in this class. The extra factors and time-varying returns
would not be there (and will quickly disappear in the
future) if lots of people were willing and able to take
them. The presence of multiple factors wakes us up to
the possibility that we, like the average investor, may
be exposed to extra risks, possibly without realizing it.
5. Apply the logic of the multifactor-efficient
frontier. Figure 2 now summarizes the basic advice.
After thinking through which risk factors are good to
hold, and which ones you are already too exposed to;
after thinking through what extra premiums you are
likely to get for taking on extra risks, you can come to
a sensible decision about which risks to take and
which to hedge.
6. Do not forget, the average investor holds the
market. If youre pretty much average, all this thought
will lead you right back to holding the market index.
To rationalize anything but the market portfolio, you
have to be different from the average investor in some
identifiable way. The average investor sees some risk
in value stocks that counteracts their attractive average
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investor is feeling very wealthy and risk-tolerant,
therefore stock prices have risen to unprecedented
levels and expected stock returns look very low. Its
tempting to sell, but perhaps youre feeling pretty
wealthy and risk-tolerant as well.
7. Of course, avoid taxes and snake oil. The mar-
keting of many securities and funds is not particular-
ly clear on the nature of the risks. There is no reliable
extra return without risk. The economic reasoning in
this article should be useful to figure out exactly what
type of risk a specific fund or strategy is exposed to,
and then whether it is appropriate for you. The aver-
age actively managed fund still underperforms its style
benchmark, and past performance has almost no infor-
mation about future performance.
The most important piece in traditional portfolio
advice applies as much as ever: Avoid taxes and
transaction costs. The losses from churning a portfo-
lio and paying needless short-term capital gain, inher-
itance, and other taxes are larger than any of the
multifactor and predictability effects I have reviewed.
Tax issues are much less fun but more important to
the bottom line.
A big insurance market
It is tempting to think of asset markets like a
racetrack, but they are in reality a big insurance market.
Value funds seem to provide extra returns to their in-
vestors by buying distressed stocks on the edge of
bankruptcy. Long-Term Capital Management was, it
seems, providing catastrophe insurance by intermedi-
ating liquid assets that investors like into illiquid
assets that were vulnerable to a liquidity crunch.
Who better to provide catastrophe insurance than rich
investors with no other labor income or other risk ex-
posure? Once again, we are reminded that Adam
Smiths invisible hand guides self-interested decisions
to socially useful ends, often in mysterious ways.
However, asset markets could be better insurance
markets. Both new and old portfolio advice implies
that the typical investor should hold a stock position
that is short his company, industry, or other easily
hedgeable kinds of risk. Many managers and some
senior employees must hold long positions in their
own companies, for obvious incentive reasons. But
there is no reason that this applies to union pension
funds, for example. A little marketing and help from
policy should make funds that hedge industry-specif-
ic risks to labor income much more attractive vehicles.
APPENDIX
Multifactor portfolio mathematics
This section summarizes algebra in Fama (1996). The
big picture is that we still get a hyperbolic region
since betas are linear functions of portfolio weights
just like means.
The problem is, minimize the variance of a portfo-
lio given a value for the portfolio mean and its beta


























































Then the portfolio return is
RR
p =￿ w;
the condition that the weights add up to 1 is
11 =￿ w.
The mean of the portfolio return is
ER Ew w ER wE
p () ( ) ( ) =￿ = ￿ = ￿ R .
The last equality just simplifies notation. The beta of
the portfolio on the extra factor is
bb
p w =￿ .
The variance of the portfolio return is
var( ) Rw V w
p =￿ ,
where V is the variance-covariance matrix of returns.
The problem is then
min s.t. E
w
p wV w w w w
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The first order conditions with respect to w give
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The portfolio variance is then
var . () ( ) RA V A
p =￿ =￿ ￿
- - wV w dd
11
Or, writing out the sum of the matrix notation,















The variance is a quadratic function of the mean
return and of the desired beta on additional factors.
Thats why we draw cup-shaped frontiers. As with
the mean-variance case, the multifactor efficient fron-
tier is a revolution of a hyperbola. If V is a second
moment matrix, to handle a risk-free rate,
var , ( ) () () R A VA A V VA A VA
p =￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
-- - - -- dd
11 1 1 11 S
where S now denotes the return variance-covariance
matrix.
Finding the benefits of a market timing
strategy without computing the strategy
I show first that the squared maximum unconditional
Sharpe ratio is the average of the squared conditional
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denotes the unconditional Sharpe ratio, and
sE R RR R tt
f
t
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denotes the conditional Sharpe ratio.
The technique exploits ideas from Gallant, Hansen,
and Tauchen (1990). I exploit Hansen and Jagannathans
(1991) theorem that for any excess return Z and dis-











and equality is attained for some choice of m. Thus,
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Gallant, Hansen, and Tauchen show how to
solve this problem in quite general situations. They
phrase their result as a lower bound on discount
factor volatility but given E(Z)/s(Z) £ s(m)/E(m), one
can read the maximum slope of the unconditional mean-
variance frontier (Sharpe ratio) available from market-
timing portfolios. To keep the calculation transparent
and simple, I specialize to the case of a constant and
observed real risk-free rate Rf = 1/Et(m). Then, the
unconditional squared Sharpe ratio is the average





























Next, I show that when we forecast stock returns
with a regression such as equation 1, and interest
rates and the conditional variance of the error term
are constant, then the best unconditional Sharpe










where s E RR RR
ff
0 = -- () / () s  denotes the uncon-
ditional buy-and-hold Sharpe ratio.


























The last line demonstrates ss R R
* /. =+ - 0
22 2 1
To obtain the annualized Sharpe ratios reported in
table 1, I divide by the square root of horizon, since
mean returns roughly scale with horizon and stan-
dard deviations roughly scale with the square root
of horizon.
If the conditional Sharpe ratio is generated by
a single asset (the market), and a linear model with
constant error variance,
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